U.S. Learns From Israel-Hezbollah War

By Tom Vanden Brook,
USA TODAY
USAToday

WASHINGTON — Senior Pentagon officials are using a classified Army study on the 2006 war between Israel and the militant group Hezbollah to retool the U.S. military's combat strategy for future wars.

That means focusing on heavy armor, such as Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles; more body armor; and unmanned aircraft that can monitor enemy activity and fire missiles at enemy fighters.

Such an approach conflicts with the current emphasis on counterinsurgency operations, which are being waged in Iraq and Afghanistan. Counterinsurgency tactics could leave U.S. forces vulnerable to the kind of coordinated attacks that stymied Israel.

"It's not just counterinsurgency," said Rickey Smith, of the Army Capabilities Integration Center-Forward Office. "This was a wake-up call to all of us as analysts."

The study by the Center for Army Analysis, which provided an unclassified version to USA TODAY, stresses that guerrillas armed with high-tech equipment can fight a modern military force to a standstill.

"People think of an irregular force, that they might not be as competent as a regular army," said Col. Tom Slafkosky of the Center for Army Analysis.

"In fact, they may be much more dangerous and competent because they're much more motivated to fight, and they will take the initiative."

Israel, center director E.B. Vandiver said, trained its troops for security and police operations, not full combat against a well-trained enemy.

The Israelis confronted Hezbollah fighters armed with Russian-made Kornet anti-tank weapons and who used sophisticated computer and communications networks to relay messages to different groups of fighters.

The main lesson for the Army from the Israel-Hezbollah conflict:

Prepare for a fight more complex and deadly than the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Already, U.S. forces are seeing signs in Iraq of the kind of underground bunkers used by Hezbollah in Lebanon, Slafkosky said.

The Army Has Identified Several Lessons, According To Smith. They Include:

•Train soldiers to use a full range of combat skills, not just how to conduct counterinsurgency operations against an enemy with limited weapons.

•Equip soldiers with vehicles that can take blasts and shoot down rockets; sensors that can detect enemy tunnels; and unmanned planes that provide video of enemy activity. In President Bush's 2009 budget, the Army asked for $3.6 billion to develop Future Combat Systems, a suite of vehicles, weapons, sensors and communication equipment.

•Conduct a media campaign during such conflicts to get out the U.S. message to local and international audiences. Soldiers skilled in communication need to be on the front line not for propaganda, but to explain U.S. actions.

"It's still going to boil down to a human contest," Smith said. "But we don't want it to be a fair fight. We want to win with overwhelming force."

Members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army Secretary Pete Geren and Marine Commandant James Conway have seen the classified version of the briefing.

"The Army's lesson is that it has to focus on a continuum of threats," said Dov Zakheim, former Defense Department comptroller and now a vice president at Booz Allen Hamilton. He has not seen the briefing but has studied the conflict.

Spending billions on the Army's Future Combat System to confront the threat would be the wrong approach, said Michael O'Hanlon, a military analyst at the Brookings Institution.

Adding updated communication equipment to vehicles such as Strykers and MRAPs would save billions, he said. "I'd be more inclined to keep a large enough ground force and keep it well trained," he said.

Retired Army major general Robert Scales, who has seen the briefing, called Hezbollah's tactics a revolution in warfare.

"This is the first time an irregular force has been equipped with precision weapons," he said.

Scales' Solution:

more U.S. infantry troops riding to battle in vehicles that can withstand roadside bombs and armed with real-time information about the enemy's movements. While air power is important, he said, ground troops are critical to rooting out the enemy.

"The Israelis could have put 2,000 F-16s over Lebanon," he said, "and it would not have made a lick of difference."

Potential U.S. adversaries know about Hezbollah's success, too, Slafkosky said. "They share this stuff all the time on the Internet."

Such threats, Vandiver said, are "proliferating. They can only get bigger, badder and harder."